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donor volume developed for the lung transplant program
at Toronto General Hospital provided the unique field
strength that enabled the innovating surgeons to assure
their patients that bilateral pneumonectomy and extracor-
poreal membrane oxygenator support would be followed
by a successful transplant (Cypel and Keshavjee 2011).
Innovation at the leading edge of surgical practice
requires a learning environment and authoritative over-
sight. The Surgeon-in-Chief, in consultation with a com-
mittee of appropriate stakeholders, can provide the
standing institutional memory and the authority to ensure
that this important source of surgical progress is managed
safely and effectively.
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When Thomas E. Starzl undertook the first human liver
transplantation in 1963, he took a great risk. With his
team, he had practiced the technique of liver transplant-
ation in nearly 200 animals, but never in humans. The 3-
year-old patient, whom I will call Tommy Smith,1 had
biliary atresia, which caused bile to accumulate in the
liver, leading to irreparable damage and eventually liver
failure. Tommy had been on life support with a ventila-
tor, and he would surely have died soon. Theoretically, a
liver transplantation might save Tommy’s life. However,
Starzl could not be certain about the safety or efficacy of
the intervention. Could he expose Tommy to the risks of
an untried intervention?
In 1963, research ethics review committees or institu-
tional review boards were not yet widely established.
Instead, Starzl consulted a colleague, who was chair of
the Department of Pediatrics at the university hospital in
Denver, “had no trouble distinguishing right from
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1. Although Tommy’s real name is used in the book, I am not sure whether he would have wanted his name mentioned. Therefore,
I am using a pseudonym instead.
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wrong” (Starzl 1992, 98), and supported Starzl in going
ahead with the surgery. In his memoirs, Starzl describes
the scene immediately after Tommy’s death:
The surgeons stayed in the operating room for a long time
after, sitting on the low stools around the periphery, looking at
the ground and saying nothing. The orderlies came and began
to mop the floor. … It was not the last time I would see this
scene, both in my dreams and in reality. I never heard anyone
who was there describe this as “the [Smith] case”, or the first
human liver transplantation. If they mentioned it at all, it was
always just about [Tommy]. (Starzl 1992, 100)
Tommy’s death caused immense suffering, for the
boy himself, for those who loved him, and for those who
treated and operated on him. Was it tragic or was it rep-
rehensible? Was it terrible or was it wrong?
One month after Tommy died, Starzl and his team
successfully transplanted two other patients. Liver trans-
plantation soon became a viable and established inter-
vention, which saved patients’ lives. This is not typical
for innovations in health care: Many newly approved
medical treatments may not succeed in saving or signifi-
cantly prolonging lives (Davis et al. 2017), and cause
harm. Liver transplantation, however, was an innovative
breakthrough. Starzl had developed it within the context
of clinical research—or what passed for it in the 1960s—
and presented the results at scientific conferences. He
thus acted in accordance with what Earl calls the
“research standard” (2019): the (moral) obligation for
doctors to collect and share information about the clinical
outcomes of innovative treatments to benefit future
patients or society at large. Ideally, doctors should set up
randomized controlled clinical trials. Less rigorous
“learning activities,” Earl argues, may only exacerbate
the risks of diffusion of insufficiently tested interven-
tions. Thus, Earl proposes that when clinicians engage in
innovative practices, they should justify not only why
they diverge from standard care, but also why they fail
to set up a scientifically valid clinical trial. Earl further
assumes that for all innovative practices, “prospective
review by expert peers and institutional officials is
crucial” (2019, 14). I disagree with the latter.
Clinicians should not need to seek the approval of a
research ethics review committee or any other form of for-
mal institutional review. When deviating from standard
care, clinicians must answer first and foremost to them-
selves. Innovative practice is often meant to benefit an
individual patient with an unmet medical need, who may
have exhausted standard treatment options. In this situ-
ation, the clinician must assess the balance of risks and
potential benefits of the innovative treatment and make a
difficult clinical judgment, without an expert consensus to
fall back on. Medicine is an art, not only a science.
Innovative practice is at—or near—the heart of that art. It
demands decision making that is—at least in part—moral.
Innovative practice falls, or should fall, within the discre-
tion of the treating clinician. Arguably, clinicians may be
at the heights of their potential, as medical professionals,
precisely when they make difficult decisions such as these.
When doing so, they exercise professional autonomy, in
the Kantian sense, as having their own (auto) law (nomos),
as setting a norm for themselves.
It is recommendable, even obligatory, as Starzl did,
to ask for advice from colleagues. When engaging in
innovative practices, clinicians should consult (a multi-
disciplinary group of) peers, and especially experts. But
this should not be to ensure “support or approval” (Earl
2019), but to improve the process of clinical and moral
decision making. Discussions with others may serve as
mirrors, support one’s deliberation process, and improve
one’s plan. Of course, patients, too, have an important
role to play in decision making with regard to innovative
treatments, and it is beyond doubt that enhanced
informed consent procedures are imperative. Ultimately,
however, the responsibility for the innovative treatment
should rest and remain with the treating clinician.
Institutional review is not necessary, and it may even
undermine clinicians’ professional ethics.
Roger Brownsword, a law professor in the United
Kingdom, once used a metaphor of London Underground
drivers to illustrate this point (Brownsword 2019).2 In 1999,
at Ladbroke Grove station 31 people died when two metro
trains collided after a newly employed driver neglected a
stop signal. In response to incidents like these, Transport for
London introduced “automatic train protection,” a technol-
ogy that puts trains to an immediate halt when they miss
stop signals. Transport for London did so—rightly—to pre-
vent avoidable harms. But the technology also has a down-
side: Metro drivers no longer have the opportunity to make
wrong or right decisions. There are no assessments, no judg-
ments to be made. In fact, drivers are no longer moral
agents. As Transport for London engineered safety into the
underground system, it has inadvertently taken ethics out of
the practice of metro driving.
If clinicians are required to obtain institutional
approval for a planned innovative treatment, they are
not granted the opportunity to make ethical decisions.
Instead, they are asked to fill out forms and get docu-
ments signed. The accumulation, in health care, of rules
to follow, forms to fill out, boxes to check, may eventu-
ally come to abrogate ethics. It directs attention away
from the most important question: “Am I doing the right
thing?” Instead, it places focus on questions that are
much less important: “Am I following the rules?”; “How
can I obtain approval from the committee?”; “Have I
received the right documents?”; “Are all documents
signed properly by the right officials?” This displacement
of focus is not conducive to the development of respon-
sible professionals with strong ethical compasses. It may
actually lead to the opposite.
2. Brownsword mentioned this incident in a lecture in the
Netherlands around 10 years ago. In his new book Law,
Technology and Society: Re-Imagining the Regulatory Environment
he briefly refers to it.
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Good health care requires professionals who have
integrity, who are trustworthy and responsible, also in sit-
uations when—in a manner of speaking—nobody is look-
ing, or overseeing. In their efforts to prevent harms,
institutions tend to introduce more and more rules and
regulations. But as full control or constant oversight is sim-
ply not possible, these regulatory efforts may be misdir-
ected. Instead, institutions should allow professionals to
exercise their discretion for the good, give them the oppor-
tunity to practice and cultivate ethical thinking and ethical
behavior and learn to regulate themselves, not seek regula-
tion by others. To do so safely, institutions should invest
in moral education, have high expectations of professio-
nals, and have very low tolerance for breaches of trust.
Importantly, clinicians should be deserving of the
trust given to them by patients, societies, and institu-
tions, and may not exploit it. For instance, doctors must
protect desperate patients asking for untested interven-
tions that are considered unsafe or ineffective. Also, they
may not expose their patients to risks for self-interested
reasons, such as financial or reputational rewards. We
expect no less of doctors than that they act in the best
interests of their patients.
I agree with Earl that if clinicians have the capabil-
ities, the time, and the means to set up a robust clinical
trial, they should do so, in the interests of society and to
the advancement of medicine. They should not, however,
be compelled to seek institutional approval when consid-
ering innovative treatments for individual patients with
unmet medical needs. Ultimately, such “overregulation”
will not serve the interests of patients. Patients need
clinicians who can both take and deserve responsibility
for clinical and moral judgment. 
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Earl (2019) argues that the current uniform restriction of
innovative practice limits clinicians’ ability to provide opti-
mal treatment and stunts progress in medicine. We agree
that it is important to balance evidence-based regulation and
innovation to foster new discoveries in medicine. However,
we believe that the risks of encouraging innovative practice,
as outlined by the authors, have been underestimated.
Earl argues that any risk would be mediated by the
implementation of a governing body that would oversee
clinicians’ appropriate use of innovative practice.
However, he does not specify how such a regulatory
body could be implemented, how rules would be
enforced, and how conflicts of interest would be
handled, nor who would be liable if the treatment caused
unexpected harm. These questions are not insignificant.
However, the most pertinent question is how these gov-
erning bodies would manage the risks of innovative
practice when the risks are unknown and there is little
high-quality evidence to guide them. As it stands, evi-
dence-based treatments produced through the current
research standard and the mechanisms through which
they are translated, such as practice guidelines and pro-
fessional body endorsements, are not sufficient to ensure
the best practice implementation of interventions in
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